Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the "moral hazard effect" of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the "stabilization effect" of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.
Introduction
In response to the global financial crisis, a number of countries substantially increased the coverage of their financial safety nets in order to restore market confidence and to avert potential contagious runs on their banking sectors. This has rekindled the debate on the impact of deposit insurance on banking sector stability and performance. While previous studies suggest that deposit insurance exacerbates moral hazard problems in bank lending and is associated with higher likelihood of banking crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 2002) , to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that examines the impact of deposit insurance on bank risk and stability during a period of global financial instability. This is an important gap in the literature since economic theories suggest that deposit insurance brings both benefits and costs that are likely to vary with economic conditions. That is, while deposit insurance can increase moral hazard and make financial systems more vulnerable to crises during good times, it can also enhance depositor confidence and reduce the likelihood of contagious bank runs during turbulent periods such as the recent global financial crisis. The net effect of deposit insurance on bank risk and stability, therefore, depends on whether the benefits of deposit insurance can outweigh its costs.
In this paper, we take advantage of the global financial crisis and study whether deposit insurance schemes have a stabilizing effect during financially turbulent periods. Specifically, using a sample of 4,109 publicly traded banks in 96 countries, we examine the impact of deposit insurance on bank risk and systemic stability separately for the crisis period from 2007 to 2009, as well as the three years from 2004 to 2006 leading up to the global financial crisis. We use zscore and stock return volatility to measure standalone risk of an individual bank, and the marginal expected shortfall (MES) of Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) to measure the risk posed by an individual bank to the banking system as a whole. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and reduce systemic stability in non-crisis years. However, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater during the global financial crisis in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Nevertheless, the overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. Consistent with the prior literature, we also find that good supervision can enhance the positive effects of deposit insurance during turbulent periods and dampen the negative effects due to moral hazard during normal times. Our findings offer new insights into the effect of deposit insurance on banking sector stability and have important policy implications for the design of banking sector regulation and supervision.
Starting with Merton (1977) , a number of theoretical papers have studied the relationship between deposit insurance and banking sector stability.
2 Deposit insurance protects the interests of unsophisticated depositors and helps prevent bank runs which can improve social welfare.
This positive stabilization effect of deposit insurance is, naturally, more important during economic downturns when contagious bank runs are more likely to occur. Consistent with this view, Gropp and Vesala (2004) show that the adoption of deposit insurance is associated with lower bank risk in the European Union. Chernykh and Cole (2011) also document that the adoption of deposit insurance in Russia is associated with better financial intermediation. Karels and McClatchey (1999) find stabilization effects from the adoption of deposit insurance for US credit unions.
There is also considerable consensus in the literature that deposit insurance exacerbates moral hazard problems in the banking sector by incentivizing banks to take on excessive risk. Moreover, critics of deposit insurance, argue that the government may lack the resources, information or incentives to correctly assess bank risk and charge deposit insurance premium accordingly. Any risk based premium charged may be deemed "unfair" leading to distortions and inefficiencies in the banking sector.
A number of papers have emphasized how design features of deposit insurance schemes and the larger institutional environment may affect the relationship between deposit insurance and banking risk and bank system fragility. In poor institutional settings, generous design features tends to destabilize the banking system and to undermine market discipline. Hovakimian, Kane and Laeven (2003) and Laeven (2002) show that weak institutional environments undermine deposit-insurance design. Cull, Senbet and Sorge (2004) Our paper is related to Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) , which studies the link between deposit insurance and the occurrence of banking crisis. Unlike Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache (2002) who focus on the likelihood of crisis of a particular country, we study the impact of deposit insurance on bank risk and system stability during a global crisis period and compare it to normal times. Our paper is also related to Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2011) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012) , who investigate the determinants of bank performance during the recent crisis. While their focus is on bank characteristics that affect performance, we focus on the effect of deposit insurance on bank risk and stability. We also add to the literature that has shown that features of a country's private and public contracting environment to be important in deposit-insurance adoption, design and performance (see for instance, Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 2002). We show that good supervision can affect the state-varying benefits and costs of deposit insurance. Strong supervision and regulation can enhance the stabilization effects during crisis periods while dampening the negative effects associated with moral hazard during normal times.
While there is widespread agreement in the academic literature that deposit insurance affects bank risk through two channels, stabilization and moral hazard, our paper is the first to document that the net impact of deposit insurance varies with the relative importance of these two effects. Our results indicate that deposit insurance indeed enhanced depositor confidence and had positive stabilization effects during the recent global financial crisis, albeit having contributed to the occurrence of the crisis in the first place, with an overall destabilizing effect over the full sample. Our findings also emphasize the role of regulation and supervision in the effectiveness of deposit insurance schemes by maximizing the benefits of deposit insurance while minimizing costs associated with incentives and moral hazard.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the construction of the sample and variables. Section 3 presents the empirical results and discusses the implications.
Section 4 concludes.
Data

Sample and Bank Level Variables
Our sample consists of all publicly traded banks covered by the Bankscope database. We use stock market information from Compustat for international banks and stock market information from CRSP for U.S. banks. The Bankscope database reports detailed balance sheet and income statement information for both public and private banks and covers over 90% of the total banking assets in a given country. The Compustat database provides daily stock price information for both active and delisted companies, accounting for 98% of the global stock market capitalization. CRSP is the standard source for stock price information of U.S. Bank level variables are constructed from the Bankscope database. We follow Laeven and Levine (2009) to compute z-score which is an accounting based measure of bank risk commonly used in the literature. Z-score is calculated as the sum of average bank return on assets (net income divided by total assets) and bank equity to assets ratio, scaled by the standard deviation of return on assets over a five-year rolling window. Higher z-score indicates lower bank risk. We use the natural logarithm of z-score in our regressions because the distribution of z-score is highly skewed. We also compute an additional measure of bank risk using market prices. In particular, we use bank stock return volatility to measure bank risk. Bank stock return volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of bank daily stock returns in a fiscal year.
Higher stock return volatility indicates higher bank risk.
In addition, for each bank, each year, we calculate bank size (natural logarithm of total assets), leverage (liabilities divided by total assets), provisions (loan loss provisions divided by total assets), reliance on deposits for funding (deposits divided by total assets), and profitability (net income divided by total assets) as control variables. We winsorize all financial variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentile level of their distributions to reduce the influence of outliers and potential data errors.
Systemic Stability Measure
The global financial crisis has led to a re-examination of risk assessment practices and regulation of the financial system, with a renewed interest in systemic fragility and macroprudential regulation. This requires a focus not on the risk of individual financial institutions, but on an individual bank's contribution to the risk of the financial system as a whole. Hence, there is a growing consensus that from a regulatory perspective of ensuring systemic stability, the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks is much more relevant than the absolute level of risk taking in any individual institution. In addition to the bank level standalone measures of risk we also compute a measure of each bank's contribution to the system as a whole. Our measure is based on the expected capital shortfall framework developed by Acharya, Engle and Richardson
The systemic expected shortfall of an institution describes the capital shortage a financial firm would experience in case of a systemic event. It is based on the notion that a shortage of capital is dangerous for the individual firm, but becomes dangerous for the whole economy if it occurs just when the rest of the banking sector is also undercapitalized. This measure is meant to capture how much each firm contributes to the risk of the banking system as a whole. The capital short fall depends on the firm's leverage and equity loss conditional on an aggregate market decline. Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) of a firm is the expected loss an equity investor in a financial firm would experience if the market declined substantially. Following Acharya et al (2010), we use MES as our systemic risk measure. 3 MES measures the average firm return on days when the market as a whole is in the tail of its loss distribution:
Above, is the financial firm i's equity return and is the aggregate market index return. A systemic event is defined as a drop of the market index below a threshold, C, over a given time horizon. The systemic event is thus denoted by < . Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) show that MES can be used to set capital limits based on systemic risk contributions. Since the book value of debt will be will be relatively unchanged while equity values fall by MES, a regulator can require a bank to hold equity to satisfy a prudential capital ratio of k% to make sure that the systemic risk posed by the bank is zero:
We compute MES using a threshold that corresponds to the index at its lowest 5% level over the previous one year of return data. 4 For this computation we use daily stock returns from
Compustat for international financial firms and daily stock market information from CRSP for U.S. financial firms. For the aggregate market index, we use the country stock index in which the financial firm is incorporated.
We have found similar results using the conditional value-at-risk (CoVar) measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) . 4 We have found similar results using changes in Merton (1970) distance-to-default measure instead of stock market returns. 
Deposit Insurance and other Country Level Variables
Country level variables are collected from a number of sources. We use two separate measures of deposit insurance. The first measure comes from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008) .
Specifically, deposit insurance dummy is created and set equal to 1 if a country has explicit deposit insurance and depositors were fully compensated the last time a bank failed. It is set equal to 0 otherwise. The second deposit insurance measure comes from Demirguc-Kunt, Kane, to measurement error in the deposit insurance variable and may bias us against finding any significant results, it alleviates the concern that some unobservable country characteristics drive both changes in deposit insurance and bank risk.
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We also control for a number of country level variables to further deal with the potential omitted variable problem. Specifically, since both bank performance and deposit insurance can be affected by economic conditions in a country, we obtain economic development measures from the World Bank's World Development Indictor (WDI) database. We use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita to measure the economic development of a country, the variance of GDP growth rate to measure economic stability, the natural logarithm of population to measure country size, and imports plus exports of goods and service divided GDP to measure global integration (Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk 2011). We also use stock market capitalization divided by GDP and private credit divided by GDP from the Financial Structure Dataset (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2010) ) to control for differences in financial development and 6 It might be argued that the deposit insurance scheme in 2003 is positively correlated with government interventions in the recent crisis, which seems to favor our hypothesis that deposit insurance is associated with lower bank risk in the crisis. However, there is no evidence for such a claim and in contrast previous studies have suggested that lack of deposit insurance may increase the genorousity of financial safety nets ( Table 1 provides the summary statistics of variables used in this study. An average bank in the sample has a logzscore of 3.50, stock return volatility of 0.03 and systemic risk of -2.46. In addition, the average bank has log total asset value of 7.66, and leverage ratio of 0.90. These numbers are comparable to those in previous studies such as Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, and Zhu (2012) . Table 2 presents the sub-sample comparisons of means of our main variables of interest.
Empirical Methodology and Results
Summary Statistics
In Panel A of Table 2 , we partition our sample by whether a country offers deposit insurance and whether the country is in a crisis period. The results suggests that in the non-crisis period, banks in countries without deposit insurance have higher z-score, lower return volatility, and lower systemic risk. During crisis years bank risk, stock return volatility and systemic risk increases substantially. More importantly, compared to countries with deposit insurance coverage, countries without such coverage experience larger increases in bank risk, stock return volatility and systemic risk. In Panel B of Table 2 , we partition our sample by whether a country offers full coverage and whether the country is in a crisis year. The results are similar to those in Panel A of Table 2 . The differences between deposit insurance and no deposit insurance samples are statistically and economically significant. Overall, the univariate results in Table 2 are consistent with our conjecture that the effect of deposit insurance on bank risk is time varying. Next, we conduct formal tests of our hypothesis using multivariate regressions controlling for country and firm differences.
Bank Risk
We first examine whether the impact of deposit insurance on bank risk varies during crisis and pre-crisis years. 
Our dependent variable is bank i's risk (in country j in year t), logzscore ijt , which is equal to the sum of average bank return on assets (net income divided by total assets) and bank equity to assets ratio scaled by the standard deviation of return on assets over a five-year rolling window. Main explanatory variables of interest are the two interaction terms: one between deposit insurance coverage and crisis year dummy, and the other between deposit insurance coverage and non-crisis year dummy. This specification allows deposit insurance to have different effects on bank risk in crisis and non-crisis periods. Since we include a crisis dummy, the coefficients on the interaction terms correspond to differences in risk for banks with deposit insurance coverage and those without, similar to the differences we reported in Table 2 . In the regression, we control for bank characteristics that can affect risk. Bank level control variables include log value of bank assets, leverage, provisions to net interest income ratio, reliance on deposits for funding, and profitability. We also include country level controls including the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, variance of GDP growth rate, natural logarithm of population, imports plus exports of goods and service divided GDP, stock market capitalization divided by GDP, private credit divided by GDP, and crisis year dummy. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year to alleviate any reverse causality problems. Table 3 presents the coefficient estimates. Column (1) of Table 3 shows that deposit insurance has a positive and statistically significant effect on bank zscore in crisis years and a negative and statistically significant effect on bank zscore in pre-crisis years. This suggests that deposit insurance reduced bank risk during the recent crisis and increased bank risk in the years leading up to the crisis. However, the average effect of deposit insurance over the full sample period is still negative, since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during the global financial crisis. In terms of control variables, we find that banks with higher leverage ratios have higher risk and banks that rely more on deposits have lower risk. Higher loan loss provisions seem to increase bank risk while greater profitability tends to be associated with lower risk. For country level variables, we find that bank risk is positively correlated with variance of GDP growth and is higher in crisis years, and bank risk is negatively correlated with private credit offered by financial institutions. Finally, as expected, bank risk is substantially higher in crisis years.
We consider an alternative regression specification that allows us to estimate an incremental effect of deposit insurance on bank risk in crisis years directly. 
This is a diff-in-diff specification. The coefficient on the interaction term corresponds to the difference during crisis and non-crisis period of the differences in risk for banks with deposit insurance coverage and those without. Column (2) of Table 3 presents the results. Our dependent variable is still bank i's risk (in country j in year t) logzscore ijt . Our main explanatory variables of interest are deposit insurance and the interaction term between deposit insurance coverage and crisis year dummy. The control variables are similar to those we used in Column
(1). We find that the main effect of deposit insurance is negatively and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that, on average, deposit insurance exacerbates moral hazard and leads to excess risk taking in non-crisis years. The interaction term between deposit insurance and crisis year is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the economic magnitude of the incremental effect is greater than that of the main effect, suggesting that deposit insurance enhances investor confidence and reduces bank risk during a crisis.
As an alternative measure of deposit insurance coverage, we use full coverage dummy to replace the deposit insurance coverage dummy. The regression results are presented in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 , and they are consistent with those in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 .
Overall, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that deposit insurance increases bank risk in pre-crisis years and decreases bank risk in crisis years, with an average negative effect for the entire sample period. In addition, Table 3 shows that the full coverage dummy has a slightly higher time varying impact on bank risk, consistent with previous studies which suggest that full coverage may further exacerbate the moral hazard problem (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 2002).
Bank Stock Return Volatility
Next, we examine the impact of deposit insurance on bank stock return volatility. Our dependent variable is bank i's volatility (in country j in year t), which is calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in a fiscal year. The regression specifications and control variables are the same as those used in Section 3.2 and the regression results are reported in Table 4 .
We find that, in Column (1) of Table 4 , deposit insurance dummy is associated with lower stock return volatility in crisis years but is correlated with higher stock return volatility in pre-crisis years. Column (2) of Table 4 indicates that, deposit insurance increases bank stock return volatility in non-crisis years but the positive relationship between deposit insurance and stock return volatility is completely reversed during a crisis. In terms of control variables, we find that banks with larger size, higher reliance on deposits as funding, lower loan loss provisions, and higher profitability seem to have lower stock return volatility. For country level variables, we find that countries with higher GDP per capita, lower variance of GDP growth, smaller population, and lower private credits have banks with lower stock return volatility. In addition, stock return volatility is substantially higher in crisis years.
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 , we replace the deposit insurance dummy with a full coverage dummy. The results are consistent with those in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 and are again consistent with our conjecture that deposit insurance increases bank risk in normal years but reduces bank risk in crisis years.
Bank Systemic Risk
From a regulatory perspective, there is a growing consensus that the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks is much more relevant than the absolute level of risk taking in any individual institution. Acharya (2009) suggests that if there is an implicit guarantee provided by the State to cover losses stemming from a systemic crisis, banks will have incentives to take on correlated risks. Guaranteed banks will not have incentives to diversify their operations, since the guarantee takes effect only if other banks fail at the same time. Although, the use of ex-ante bank level systemic risk measures is relatively new (and allows us to test the effects of deposit insurance during crisis and non-crisis periods), much of the earlier empirical work has also examined the relationship between deposit insurance and systemic risk as measured by the incidence of banking crisis. Thus, in this section, we examine the relationship between deposit insurance and bank systemic risk. The regression specifications and control variables are the same as those used in Section 3.2. We use marginal expected shortfall (MES) as the dependent variable to measure bank i's systemic risk (in country j in year t), described in Section 2.2. Table 5 presents the regression results. The results in Column (1) of Table 5 indicates that deposit insurance dummy is associated with lower bank systemic risk in crisis years but higher bank systemic risk in non-crisis years, and the overall effect of deposit insurance over the entire sample period is negative. Column (2) of Table 5 shows that deposit insurance increases bank systemic risk in non-crisis years but the positive effect of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk is reversed in crisis years. In terms of control variables, we find that banks with larger size, lower leverage, lower reliance on deposits as funding, and higher loan loss provisions are associated with higher systemic risk. For country level variables, we find that countries with lower GDP per capita, higher GDP volatility, smaller populations, and lower international trade have banks with higher systemic risk. These results are consistent with those in . Not surprisingly, bank systemic risk is also higher in crisis years.
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 , we replace the deposit insurance dummy with a full coverage dummy in the regression analysis of systemic risk. The results are consistent with those in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 , and are again supportive of our hypothesis.
Bank Supervision, Deposit Insurance, and Systemic Risk
We are also interested in the impact of the regulatory and institutional framework on the deposit insurance and systemic risk relationship. The adverse consequence of deposit insurance may well depend on the institutional environment and can potentially be mitigated through bank regulation. For instance, better bank supervision may limit the extent to which banks can engage in correlated risk taking activities in the presence of deposit insurance. We consider a bank supervisory quality index, which measures whether the supervisory authorities have the power and the authority to take specific preventive and corrective actions such as replacing the management team. This variable comes from the banking surveys conducted by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008) and described in Section 2.3.
Our dependent variable is bank i's systemic risk, measured by MES described in Section 2.3. The regression specifications and control variables are the same as those used in Section 3.2. Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates. We first partition the sample by the bank supervisory quality index. Column (1) of Table 6 shows the regression results for the subsample where bank supervisory quality is greater than or equal to sample median denoted as High Supervisory Quality, and Column (2) of Table 6 presents that the regressions coefficients for the subsample where bank supervisory quality is lower than sample median denoted as Low Supervisory
Quality. In Columns (3) and (4), we repeat the same regression using the full coverage as the deposit insurance measure.
We find that, in Column (1) of Table 6 , full coverage dummy is associated with lower bank systemic risk during global crisis years and has no significant adverse impact on bank systemic risk in non-crisis years, when bank supervision is strong. In contrast, Column (2) of Table 6 indicates that, full coverage increases bank systemic risk in non-crises years and has no significant positive impact during crisis years when bank supervision is weak. We obtain similar results using the full coverage as the deposit insurance measure in Columns (3) and (4). The results are stronger as full coverage is expected to lead to the most egregious moral hazard problem during good times. Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that better bank supervision can help mitigate the adverse consequences of deposit insurance while weak bank supervision exacerbates the negative impact of deposit insurance on bank stability.
Conclusion
As part of the International Monetary Fund's best practice recommendations to developing countries, deposit insurance has received increased attention from both academic researchers and public policy makers. While deposit insurance is aimed at ensuring depositor confidence and to prevent bank runs, it comes with an unintended consequence of encouraging banks to take on excessive risk. In this paper, we study the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and system fragility during the global financial crisis and the period preceding it.
We show that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the crisis. However, both standalone bank risk and systemic risk are lower during the global financial crisis in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our results suggest that deposit insurance seem to have offered significant stabilization effects during the recent banking crisis. Nevertheless, the overall impact of deposit insurance on bank risk over the full sample period remains negative, since the stabilization effect during the crisis period tends to be smaller than destabilizing effect of the insurance in the period leading up to the crisis. We also find that good bank supervision can alleviate the adverse consequence of deposit insurance on systemic risk in good times. Our results stress the importance of the underlying regulatory and institutional framework and lend support to the view that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability. -2009 is the natural logarithm of the sum of ROA and equity ratio (ratio of book equity to total assets), averaged over the past five years, divided by the standard deviation of ROA over the past five years. We require a bank to have at least four years of data in the past five years. Volatility is the stock return volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock return over the fiscal year. Log (Total Assets) is the log value of total assets in millions of US dollars. Leverage is total liabilities divided by total assets. Provisions is loan loss provisions divided by net interest income. Deposits is total deposits divided by total assets. ROA is net income divided by total assets. Log (GDP Per Capita) is the log value of GDP per capital in nominal constant US 2000 dollars. GDP Growth Volatility is the variance of GDP growth for the previous five years. Log (Population) is the log value of population in millions. Trade / GDP is imports plus exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP. Stock Market Cap / GDP is stock market capitalization divided by GDP. Private Credit / GDP is private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. Deposit Insurance Dummy is a variable that indicates whether a country has explicit deposit insurance (Yes=1/No=0) and whether depositors were fully compensated the last time a bank failed (Yes=1/No=0 
